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Indigenous Melanesians, known as Kanak, compose 45 percent of the
population of New Caledonia, a Melanesian archipelago that is located
1,500 kilometers east of Australia but administered by metropolitan
France.1 Kanak groups have long been struggling for self-rule. Today, pro-
independence leaders perceive economic autonomy as a prerequisite for
political independence. Although the main island is rich in mineral ore,
New Caledonia lacks the financial capital and technological skills neces-
sary to launch large-scale projects on its own. Therefore, people in favor
of independence call for the formation of economic relationships with
institutions from nations other than France.2 Falconbridge, a large multi-
national mining company based in Canada, fits this bill quite adequately.
Its Koniambo Project, a joint venture with a local mining company, is still
in the planning stages. If it goes ahead, it will involve the exploitation of
nickel from the Koniambo Massif, a compact group of mountains that
stretches between Koné and Voh in the Northern Province (see map 1), as
well as the local construction of a nickel refinery to process the ore. This
project has created hopes not only for economic development but also, in
the minds of some local politicians and citizens, for building the founda-
tions of a future independence. This paper examines the significance of
the Koniambo Project in light of New Caledonia’s recent political and
economic history. 
As in other regions where particular ethnic groups have historically
been marginalized by the national government, resource sovereignty in
New Caledonia has come to be seen by independence leaders as a path to
political independence. Therefore, the Koniambo Project is important for
three reasons. First, independence advocates are well aware that the sub-
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stantial—and growing—financial assistance from metropolitan France
can only increase New Caledonia’s dependence on the metropole. Kanak
leaders have created or encouraged small-scale development projects, but
for various reasons including issues of cultural identity, expectations of
assistance, and intracommunity rivalry, these initiatives have met with lit-
tle success. Instead, people now place their hopes in the Koniambo Pro-
ject, a large-scale, exogenous venture that is expected to generate employ-
ment for local people. This project was initiated by the Société minière du
Sud Pacifique (smsp), a mining company of which Kanak own the major-
ity of shares, and which is controlled by the mainly pro-independence
Northern Province. A particular advantage of this project is that smsp’s
partner is a Canadian multinational, Falconbridge. Thus, the second rea-
son for the importance of the Koniambo Project is the fact that it is an
opportunity for a largely Kanak organization to work in collaboration
with a non-French company, further loosening New Caledonia’s depen-
dence on metropolitan France. Third, resource rights represent, in the eyes
of many Kanak, their growing attainment of recognition and autonomy.
It is clear from statements such as those made by local resident Bernard
Tchaounyane that the fact that “now the Kanak have access to mining
resources” means, for those who “still demand independence,” that “the
mine is a plus for the country” (pers comm, July 2001).3
Meanwhile, certain aspects of the New Caledonian situation make it
highly unusual. First, it differs from many cases in which ethnically dis-
tinct regions form part of larger nations, where local groups have been dis-
advantaged as repressive governments allow them only limited resource
rights or none at all. Throughout much of their colonial and even more
recent history, governments of nations around the world have appropri-
ated or allowed the appropriation of land and other natural resources,
without adequately considering the needs of their original owners.4 Local
people may protest against such situations, sometimes successfully, but
often to no avail.5 For instance, in West Papua, where ethnically Melane-
sian coalitions are demanding independence from Indonesia, multina-
tional mining activities have angered villagers. At Freeport’s Grasberg cop-
per and gold mine, local people have objected to the fact that they have
received no rent or royalties from the mining project that has encroached
on their land. This situation has ultimately resulted in a range of signifi-
cant human rights abuses being committed by the Indonesian military
(Ballard 1997; 2001; Leith 2002). In contrast, the Koniambo Project is
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viewed favorably by the vast majority of the inhabitants of the Northern
Province—most of whom are indigenous Melanesians—as promising
material benefits to redress long-standing economic imbalances. 
Second, the history of the Koniambo Project is unlike the histories of
many natural resource exploitation activities, which have inadvertently
stimulated or intensified demands for autonomy or political rights. The
most obvious example of this is Panguna, where Bougainville Copper Lim-
ited, an Australian company, began operation in 1972. In 1988, the Pan-
guna Landowners’ Association demanded that Bougainville Copper pay it
50 percent of all profits and 10 billion kina as compensation for environ-
mental damage. The villagers’ discontent eventually resulted in an escala-
tion of violence that led to the mine’s closure in 1989 and ultimately to
violent demands for the secession of Bougainville from Papua New Gui-
nea. There were many reasons for the landowners’ frustration, including
dissatisfaction with levels of compensation, the fact that the money was
not used for long-term development, and the many arguments over its dis-
tribution. Also, people were disappointed with the conditions in resettled
villages, and they were shaken by the social upheaval that the project indi-
rectly caused. Furthermore, they believed that mining pollution had led
to the disappearance of wildlife populations and posed threats to human
health. The children of those who had signed the agreements declared that
Bougainville Copper had not lived up to its promises, and that the govern-
ment of Papua New Guinea was ignoring the demands of landowners for
a fair share of the wealth (May and Spriggs 1990; Connell 1991; 1992).
However, purely political factors were also important; Bougainvilleans
had long-standing grievances against the colonial administration, which
then imposed the project on them against their will (Filer 1990). Another
example comes from Uttar Pradesh, India, where frustration over the gov-
ernment’s allocation of forestry rights to large companies rather than to
local groups led to demands for an independent state of Uttaranchal (Ran-
gan 1996). In New Caledonia, however, the opposite has occurred; Kanak
independence activists’ demands for economic and political rights have
resulted in the Koniambo Project. smsp contacted and negotiated with
Falconbridge and then convinced the French government—with assistance
of political pressure from independence party leaders—to help it obtain
the Koniambo Massif from a French mining company. 
New Caledonia’s atypical situation in regard to the political significance
of this mining project can be explained by the way the French government
has chosen to address Kanak demands for independence. Several years of
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violent uprisings in the mid-1980s ended with the signing of accords that
promised economic development. Both pro-independence leaders and con-
servative loyalists agreed to these measures, but for different reasons:
those in favor of independence believed that they would pave the way for
a future independent Kanaky, while their opponents hoped to render such
aspirations clearly unnecessary. 
New Caledonia’s Independence Movement 
On 24 September 1853, the French government annexed New Caledonia.
Soon thereafter, Kanak started being gradually displaced from their lands.
The indigenous populations of the main island, known as Grande Terre,
were forced onto reserves where the land was less fertile and where the res-
ident clans, who were sometimes the newcomers’ long-standing enemies,
were obliged to receive them (Saussol 1996, 196). Under the Native Regu-
lation System (Régime de l’Indigénat), Kanak were not permitted to leave
their reserves without authorization from the colonial administration. This
political order ended in 1946, allowing the Kanak freedom of movement
and releasing them from compulsory labor. Over the next decade the
Kanak progressively saw their legal rights extended with wider access to
citizenship and the gradual extension of voting rights (Dornoy 1984, 155–
156). During that period, the Kanak population transited from political
exclusion to participation in the exercise of power (Freyss 1995, 24). The
year 1956 saw the advent of universal suffrage as well as the passage of
the Defferre “outline law” (loi cadre), which ultimately gave New Cale-
donia extensive autonomy through the creation of a territorial assembly
as well as a government council with an elected president. As the domi-
nant political party, the moderate Union calédonienne thus came to power,
with an agenda that called not for independence but for reforming the
territory to undo the damage caused by its colonial heritage. Meanwhile,
a Melanesian elite came into being (Freyss 1995, 25). 
Not satisfied with their increasing integration into the prevailing
politico-economic system, Kanak radicals demanded more profound, sys-
temic changes. Unfortunately for independence activists, however, their
demands occurred at a time when France was losing its other colonies. In
the 1960s, Algeria and France’s other African possessions obtained their
independence. To mitigate these losses, France aimed to reinforce its posi-
tion in New Caledonia, encouraged by the fact that in a referendum in
1958, France’s South Pacific territories had chosen to retain the political
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status quo (Dornoy 1984, 94, 265). Meanwhile, France was becoming
increasingly interested in New Caledonia’s mineral reserves. Throughout
the 1960s, officials often referred to the strategic importance, for the
French State, of the territory’s nickel production (Howard 1991, 141). By
1974 the metropolitan government had obtained a 50 percent interest in
the territory’s largest nickel company, the Société Le Nickel (sln), and
later became the company’s exclusive owner (Winslow 1989, 113). Met-
ropolitan France assured its control of this lucrative industry by tighten-
ing the political reins in New Caledonia. In 1963, the Jacquinot Laws
reduced the powers of the Territorial Assembly and reorganized the Gov-
ernment Council, replacing its elected president with a territorial high
commissioner, a representative of the French government. The 1969 Bil-
lotte Laws further increased metropolitan France’s control in New Cale-
donia, expanding its authority over rural districts, investments, and min-
ing regulations (Dornoy 1984, 95–96). Notably, these laws transferred
the power to authorize mining activity in New Caledonia, and to set min-
eral export quotas for the territory, to the French ministry of industry
(Winslow 1989, 112). Shortly thereafter, the French government began
systematically promoting immigration to New Caledonia from France and
from the other French Pacific territories. Although these demographic
changes ultimately increased Kanak resentment (Henningham 1992b, 70),
they were intended at the time to create a political counterweight to pro-
independence stirrings (Henningham 1992a, 62). 
Indeed, in 1969, young students who had participated in the May 1968
movement in France returned to New Caledonia with Marxist and anti-
imperialist ideas. Over the next few years, encouraged by the acquisition
of independence by neighboring countries, they began to form militant,
nationalist, anti-colonialist political parties (see Henningham 1992a, 66;
Freyss 1995, 26). Many of these groups united under the rubric of the anti-
capitalist Parti de libération kanak (Palika) in 1976 (Freyss 1995, 27). By
1977, independence was the central issue in territorial assembly elections,
in which pro-independence candidates won two seats, and in 1984 a
majority of the leaders of the coalition of pro-independence parties, Front
de libération nationale kanak et socialiste (flnks), boycotted the election
(Howard 1991, 152–155). This action, led by Jean-Marie Tjibaou of the
Union calédonienne, was to signal the start of a series of violent uprisings
(see Henningham 1992a, 82–116), the most tragic of which occurred at
Gossanah, Ouvéa (see map 1). On 22 April 1988, Kanak militants invaded
a local police station, taking several gendarmes hostage and killing four
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of them in the process. On 5 May, French soldiers stormed the cave near
Gossanah where the gendarmes were being held, resulting in the deaths of
three soldiers and nineteen Kanak, including three who reportedly were
killed after they had surrendered (Henningham 1992a, 69). 
The years of bloodshed, known as les Événements (the Events), ended
a month later, in June 1988, with the Matignon Accords. This agreement
was signed by Tjibaou and his opponent, Jacques Lafleur, one of the
wealthiest men in New Caledonia and the leader of the loyalist Rassem-
blement Pour la Calédonie dans la République (rpcr). With the aim of
redressing the nation’s ethnically based economic imbalances, the text of
the accords promised restitution of customary lands, promotion of Kanak
culture, preparation of a future New Caledonian elite, and initiation of
rural development activities, and also made provisions for another refer-
endum in 1998. Furthermore, it redrew provincial boundaries—but still
left much of the territory’s wealth under the control of New Caledonians
of European origins (Howard 1991, 159). Unsatisfied with the compro-
mises reached in the accords, a flnks member from Gossanah named
Djubelly Wea (who may or may not have had the support of Kanak
nationalists) assassinated Tjibaou and his right-hand man, Yeiwene Yei-
wene, on 4 May 1989, at a customary ceremony that marked the end of
the year-long mourning period at Gossanah. 
The referendum planned in the Matignon Accords took place ten years
later; however, rather than addressing independence, as had been prom-
ised, the referendum was about the Nouméa Accord, drawn up in April
of that year. In November 1998, voters gave an overwhelming (71.87 per-
cent) approval to this accord. The text included a preamble acknowledg-
ing that the seizure of New Caledonia in 1853 had not taken into account
the Kanak people and their “special link to the land.” It also initiated
certain legislative changes to allow greater scope for the expression of
Kanak identity, notably concerning the official recognition of “Custom-
ary Regions” (Aires coutumières) and the creation of a consultative body,
the Customary Senate (Sénat coutumier). Additionally, the accords made
provisions for a gradual devolution of administrative authority to the ter-
ritory, which was recategorized as an “overseas country” (pays d’outre-
mer) in 1999—although, despite the change in nomenclature, the archi-
pelago remains a French possession. One of the powers transferred to
New Caledonia was that of drafting mining regulations, while the prov-
inces were given the responsibility of enforcing them (paragraph 3.2.5. of
the Nouméa Accord). More training and economic development programs
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were also promised. New Caledonia would thus remain a part of France,
but a new referendum would be held in fifteen to twenty years’ time. 
Politics and Economics 
Efforts toward economic development, and the struggle for—or against
—New Caledonia’s independence from France, are closely linked. Ever
since serious demands for Kanak autonomy commenced in the early
1970s, metropolitan French politicians have initiated development pro-
jects that some analysts have interpreted as attempts to distract New Cale-
donians from broader political issues. Moreover, even as local officials
have been granted more political responsibilities, ever-increasing financial
assistance has served to augment New Caledonia’s economic dependence
on the metropole. Independence leaders, aware of the pitfalls of relying
heavily on aid from metropolitan France, have created or encouraged
development projects; yet, for various reasons (discussed in the next
sections), these initiatives as well as those promoted by the central gov-
ernment have met with little success. The following review draws heavily
on Jean Freyss’s 1995 analysis of New Caledonia’s politico-economic
situation.
An “Assisted Economy” 
The response of French policymakers to the independence movement
was to try to focus attention on economic rather than political or social
changes. For instance, in a 1975 letter to the secretary in charge of over-
seas departments and territories, the high commissioner admitted that, for
the Kanak, the land question was “not purely economic,” but he deduced
that it was “nonetheless in this light that it must be considered if we are
to avoid . . . its moving . . . to the purely political arena and ending up in
a questioning of Caledonian society” (quoted in Freyss 1995, 38). Thus,
“integration” was to be accomplished without changing relationships of
dominance and subordination, or accounting for political and cultural
dimensions of the problem (Freyss 1995, 35). For example, enlargements
of reserves were at first made conditional on demonstrations of plans to
develop the lands granted, as though the issue of land claims were a purely
economic matter. 
When such policies failed to quell calls for independence, successive
French governments began to increase transfers of public funds to New
Caledonia through the creation of institutions such as fadil (Fonds
horowitz • the koniambo project in new caledonia 295
d’aide au développement de l’intérieur et des îles), set up by a right-wing
government in 1975, followed by odil (Office de développement de l’in-
térieur et des îles), created by a left-wing government in 1982. These estab-
lishments were ostensibly aimed simply at reducing economic inequalities,
especially in the distribution of land and mining revenues. They provided
the only means of access to credit for Kanak, whose lands could not be
alienated and therefore could not serve as collateral. However, fadil’s
projects were mostly considered to be failures. For instance, its fishing boat
project had only a 15 percent success rate due to a lack of infrastructure
for distributing the marine products, fishermen’s inability to purchase fuel
or to make monthly payments on the boats, and delays caused by the fact
that motors could only be repaired in distant Nouméa (Leblic 1991, 750,
752). In the wake of such disappointments, odil created networks of
rural extension workers, organized training programs, and monitored
projects. Additionally, funding was made contingent on support from both
the chief and the council of elders of the local entrepreneur’s village. 
However, such efforts in fact increased New Caledonia’s economic
dependency on metropolitan France, creating what Freyss has termed an
“assisted economy” (économie assistée) because it is founded on massive
—and growing—transfers of public funds, which swelled from 15 percent
of gross domestic product in the 1960s to 50 percent in 1987 (1995, 203).
According to Freyss, this situation reflects a deliberate intention on the
part of metropolitan policymakers to “contain the push for independence
by the intensification of development projects for Melanesians” (1995,
46). In 1970, at the height of the nickel boom, government officials wor-
ried about “an ‘economic and financial autonomy’ which would be con-
trary to the policy defined these last few years by the government, which
aims to tighten every sort of link between the metropole and New Cale-
donia” (quoted in Freyss 1995, 200). The solution they devised was to
allow nickel revenues to be invested in metropolitan French banking insti-
tutions, while other metropolitan institutions financed the nickel exploita-
tion with loans (Freyss 1995, 200). Similarly, even the Dijoud Plan of 1978
—full of rhetoric about “promoting Melanesian culture,” “respect of the
historical rights of Melanesian communities,” and the rejection of the
notion that Kanak must be integrated into “the Western way of thinking
and living”—was fundamentally conservative. As Freyss has pointed out,
the Dijoud Plan did not question existing power structures and ultimately
offered no other solution than integration into a supposedly “pluri-ethnic
society” (1995, 48–50). At first favorable to the plan, independence lead-
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ers such as François Burck finally rejected it as yet another proposal to
“inject money, but without actually abolishing the system” (Interview
with Burck, 4 July 1978, quoted in Freyss 1995, 50).
The Disappointing Record of Development 
Independence leaders were clearly aware of the dangers of the growing
dependence on metropolitan France. They viewed local, endogenous eco-
nomic development as a condition of independence (Freyss 1995, 32) and,
conversely, they considered political autonomy a prerequisite for finan-
cial well-being (Dornoy 1984, 153). Therefore, they advocated small-
scale efforts to increase all forms of self-reliance. In the early 1970s, inde-
pendence leader Jean-Marie Tjibaou promoted programs such as the
“Women’s Movement Towards a Smiling Melanesian Village” (Mouve-
ment féminin vers un souriant village mélanésien), in which several hun-
dred women in about twenty local groups participated in efforts to
improve their villages’ hygiene, fight against alcoholism, assist in children’s
education, and design recreational activities for young people. In the mid-
1970s the political parties Union progréssiste mélanésienne (Melanesian
Progressive Union) and Union calédonienne competed to initiate devel-
opment projects, while other Kanak activists formed a small mining com-
pany (Freyss 1995, 33). In 1984, when the Fabius Plan divided the territory
into four regions, each with its own elected Regional Council and presi-
dent, the flnks came into power in the North, Center, and Islands
regions while the rpcr retained control over the South. In 1985, odil
was replaced by odr (Office de développement régional), which contin-
ued to offer training programs, rural extension work, and project moni-
toring, but ceded the responsibility for financing projects to the relevant
regional authorities. At this point, economic development efforts initiated
by Kanak, such as the formation of cooperatives, acquired an even
stronger political significance (Leblic 1991, 751). Independence leaders,
temporarily forced to compromise on their ultimate political goals but
given new powers and responsibilities on the local level, focused on devel-
opment as the means of working toward an eventual independence.
Although they suffered from a lack of highly trained Kanak profession-
als, local politicians encouraged the creation of a variety of microprojects
(Freyss 1995, 59).
Nonetheless, rural New Caledonia has historically had a conspicuous
lack of economic development projects and a high rate of failure for those
that it has hosted. In 1984, small and medium-sized industries accounted
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for less than 2,000 of the 20,000 jobs in the private sector; moreover, most
of these enterprises were based in greater Nouméa. Notably, 56 percent of
these industries were initiated by metropolitan French, and not one was
created or managed by a Melanesian (Freyss 1995, 99–100). Conventional
wisdom identifies as “obstacles to development” the reticence of privileged
groups (such as Noumeans of European origins) to share their wealth,
and the supposed incompatibility of “traditional” Kanak society with
“development” and “modernity.” However, “Kanak society’s aptitude
for change” indicates that the reality is far more complex (Freyss 1995,
14). As Anthony Bebbington has pointed out, it is necessary to examine
fully the “cultural, economic, agro-ecological, and socio-political con-
texts” of local people’s engagements with development projects, because
only if we “understand the ways in which actors are situated, and how
this affects their rationales” can we comprehend why certain projects suc-
ceed while others fail (1996, 88).
One reason for the disappointing record of New Caledonia’s formal
rural development projects lies in the fact that the projects have usually
required assimilation or integration into dominant socioeconomic struc-
tures, whereas Kanak leaders have prioritized maintaining, and obtaining
recognition of, a distinctive identity (Freyss 1995, 44). Leaders have
wanted change to occur on their own terms, and they sometimes favor a
socialist vision, which they describe as corresponding to traditional cus-
toms. At its second congress in 1977, Palika leaders pronounced them-
selves against fadil’s program, insisting, “The sole condition for the
recovery of the lands is their distribution to the collectivity: no to indi-
vidual or private plots of land, no to fadil which aims to integrate, even
further, the Kanak into the capitalist system” (in Leblic 1993, 197; orig-
inal emphasis). In 1978, independence leader Nidoish Naisseline pro-
nounced himself against certain politicians’ call for a passage “from the
tribal horde symbolized by Kanak society to modern, Western society”
(Official summary report to the Territorial Assembly, June 1978, quoted
in Freyss 1995, 43). In stronger language, that same year Union calédoni-
enne counselor Éloi Machoro insisted that the independence movement’s
demands would always place cultural identity and dignity before eco-
nomic concerns, declaring that “the first step is nothing other than the
return of the lands; development of these lands will come later and the
Melanesians will require no-one else in order to realize it” (Official sum-
mary report to the Territorial Assembly, June 1978, quoted in Freyss
1995, 43).
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These statements do not mean that Kanak activists are against their
people’s advancing technologically or achieving a higher standard of liv-
ing; indeed, widespread enthusiasm about the Koniambo Project speaks
quite to the contrary. Rather, they insist on finding solutions that will
allow economic changes to occur simultaneously with the reinforcement
of cultural identity. As Jean-Marie Tjibaou noted in 1972, “the Melane-
sian’s economic participation in his country’s development” must go
hand-in-hand with “cultural information and research” (quoted in Freyss
1995, 32). Many of the Kanak with whom I discussed various small-scale
development projects expressed great interest in these opportunities yet
insisted on the importance of complete ownership of the activities. They
felt that the provincial government could contribute technical and finan-
cial support but that the appropriate customary authorities must be the
ones to make all decisions about how the project would be run and who
must manage which aspect of it, according to his or her social position.
It became quite clear to me that such considerations must be incorporated
into any development project in order for it to have any chance of suc-
cess (see Horowitz 2001). 
Another problem is that—despite mistrust of the government’s ulti-
mate aims—potential small-scale entrepreneurs have grown to expect the
administration to provide not only “employment [and] money, but also
initiative” for any small-scale project (Freyss 1995, 144). Many Kanak to
whom I spoke about various development ideas assumed that the local
(usually provincial but sometimes municipal) government should, and
would, provide all necessary financial, technical, and legal assistance.
Until they had been assured of this support, they would not take the first
step in starting, or participating in, a project. Nor, if the grant is accom-
panied by a loan, do entrepreneurs always adequately take into account
the implications of having to make monthly repayments (Freyss 1995, 387).
This attitude is not surprising given the substantial subventions granted to
local institutions by the French government, some of which trickle down
to assist rural residents with small-scale projects. Financial assistance has
increased at every economic or political crisis point over the past thirty
years, creating a “vicious circle” that makes metropolitan aid more and
more indispensable at all levels of New Caledonian society and tends to
sap individual entrepreneurship (Freyss 1995, 184–185, 229). Kanak lead-
ers have long been conscious of such problems; in 1974 André Gopoea of
the Union progressiste mélanésienne declared, “It is time now to let Mela-
nesians take initiatives; we mustn’t continue to put them to sleep. It sur-
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prises us afterwards that nothing gets achieved but the problem is due to
this theory. We give the means but we must leave some initiative to the
people concerned” (Declaration in the ordinary session of the Territorial
Assembly, 30 May 1974, quoted in Freyss 1995, 388). 
A third obstacle stems from the intensely hierarchical and competitive
nature of Kanak societies. Often, rather than personal skills or knowledge,
it is members’ social rankings within the community, based on their clans’
order of arrival, that determine their positions within a cooperative or a
small-scale enterprise. Furthermore, the enterprise itself becomes a venue
for families and clans to compete for recognition of their social standing,
as the right to make decisions about the areas in question constitutes proof
of membership in a customary landowner clan. Many a project has been
undermined by such rivalry (Freyss 1995, 277), and even the Koniambo
Project has been affected by such tensions (see Horowitz 2002).
At the same time, however, local people expect great political and
economic benefits from the Koniambo Project. These expectations are
largely grounded in the fact that the nation’s substantial mineral wealth,
long accessible only to New Caledonians of European origins, has recently
become an important stake for Kanak as well, as explained in the follow-
ing section. 
Mining in New Caledonia 
Nickel—or, to use its apt local sobriquet, “King Nick” (le Roi Nick)—
has a long history in New Caledonia. In 1863 geologist Jules Garnier dis-
covered nickel in New Caledonia, and in 1874, with the help of busi-
nessman John Higginson, the first nickel mine opened at Mont d’Or (now
Mont Dore). From then until 1900, some 600,000 tons were mined, and
3 million tons more were extracted from 1900 to 1923. By 1981, it was
estimated that 110 million tons of ore had been taken from New Cale-
donia’s soils (Bird and others 1984, 12). 
Economic Significance 
According to various estimates, New Caledonia currently has between 10
and 40 percent of the Earth’s nickel reserves and may even contain “the
richest known reserves in the world,” which could last another two hun-
dred years (Bird and others 1984, 50). It is the third largest nickel pro-
ducer, as well as the largest producer of ferro-nickel, in the world. Most
of the approximately 7.5 million tons of nickel ore extracted annually is
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currently exported in its raw form, but sln has a refinery at Doniambo
(in Nouméa) that processes one third of the ore, generating an average of
56,000 tons of metal each year (adecal 2000). In 2000, nickel ore
exports, mainly to Japan and Australia, reached 4,108,676 tons for a
total value of 15.2 billion fcfp, while exports of refined nickel were
worth 5.4 billion fcfp.6 The other productive sectors, such as agriculture
(mostly extensive cattle ranching), are weak and in relative decline (Freyss
1995, 71). Thus, as a whole, in 2000 the nickel industry contributed 92.1
percent of export revenues, although a large percentage of the returns from
this industry have usually been expatriated (Henningham 1992b, 78).
However, nickel extraction and refinement combined account for only
10 to 25 percent of gross domestic product. The remainder is contributed
primarily by rapidly expanding government administrations (which com-
monly represent nearly a third of gross domestic product, through the
salaries they distribute) and the overdeveloped commercial sector, based
mainly on importation (Freyss 1995, 69–70, 133). Meanwhile, the nickel
industry provided only 5.6 percent of salaried employment (2,750 jobs)
for the year 2000 (isee 2001). Moreover, the nickel industry has his-
torically been highly unstable, experiencing irregular booms and busts
because of market oscillations (Banks and McShane 1999, 385; Rainon
and Villedieu 1999). A particularly high boom lasted from 1967 to 1975,
in response to the economic growth of industrialized nations, the stimu-
lus of the Vietnam War, and a strike in Canada at Inco (the International
Nickel Company), sln’s main rival on a global scale (Henningham 1992a,
61). Production records were broken each year until 1971, when over 7.5
million tons of ore and 150,000 tons of metal were produced, figures that
have never since been equaled (Mathieu-Daudé 1992, 70). During that
period New Caledonia’s economy expanded as the number of wage earn-
ers rose from 20,160 in 1968 to 33,982 in 1972 (Henningham 1992b, 69),
but the increase was largely fueled by an influx of 35,000 immigrants, pri-
marily from French Polynesia, Wallis and Futuna, and metropolitan France
(Howard 1991, 145). Many of the immigrants preferred that New Cale-
donia remain a French possession, leading to heightened tensions among
ethnic groups, and between Nouméa and the rural areas (Delvinquier and
Legeard 1999). The economic boom was followed by a bust that began
in 1972, provoked by international competition and market fluctuations. 
Kanak Participation 
Until the 1960s, Kanak from Grande Terre were rarely employed in the
mining sector. Because customary obligations prevented them from report-
 
horowitz • the koniambo project in new caledonia 301
ing regularly to the work place, they were considered undesirable labor-
ers and labeled “lazy.” Mining entrepreneurs preferred to employ prison
laborers, who were “rented” to large private enterprises such as mining
companies (Merle 1995, 132), or immigrant workers under contract, who
were uprooted and therefore more docile (Freyss 1996; Angleviel 2000).
Loyaltians participated to a greater extent since, farther from their home
islands, they were less subject to social obligations, but most workers
were imported from the New Hebrides (now Vanuatu), Japan, Indonesia,
French Indochina (now part of Vietnam), Wallis and Futuna, French Poly-
nesia, and Europe (Bencivengo 1999, 125–126; Angleviel 2000, 70–75).
Moreover, the Kanak were initially confined to their reserves, making it
more difficult for them to seek employment. When the Native Regulation
System ended in 1946, they became more integrated into the mining sec-
tor but were still almost always employed as manual laborers. As mech-
anization increased, they were replaced by skilled employees who, in the
absence of a local training program, had to be brought from metropoli-
tan France or elsewhere. No Kanak occupied an executive position in the
mining sector until the 1980s (Carnuccini 1999). 
Mining has always been a huge politico-economic stake for those
involved with it; even today, “the leading European families of New Cale-
donia, which dominate the commercial economy and have great influence
in the politics of the territory, owe much of their wealth to their involve-
ment in nickel mining” (Henningham 1992b, 65). However, mining has
not historically been a primary target of New Caledonian independence
activists, nor have local communities demanded the type of compensation
payments that are common elsewhere in Melanesia.7 There are several
interrelated reasons for this, as outlined by Stephen Henningham (1992b,
74–76).8 First, New Caledonia was colonized long before most of its
neighbors, and mining has been in place nearly as long; in sharp contrast
to the situation in the independent nations of Melanesia, mining compa-
nies in New Caledonia rely on a nearly one-hundred-thirty-year history of
legislative support from the French government. Second, mining opera-
tions in this sparsely populated landscape have often taken place far from
any centers of population. (Significantly, Thio, on the east coast, is one of
the rare communities that have been affected by mining, and it has become
a focal point of nationalist activity.) Third, areas rich in minerals are usu-
ally found on remote mountaintops and are composed of soils with a high
mineral content that makes them unsuitable for agriculture. Fourth, other
targets were of higher priority in New Caledonia: The nationalist move-
ment of the 1980s concentrated on opposing French rule, while villagers’
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land conflicts primarily concerned nonindigenous cattle farmers. Fifth,
mining companies have occasionally managed to reach agreements with
communities by providing benefits such as employment. Lastly, Kanak
have largely remained outside the mainstream market economy and thus
are less aware of the benefits and costs of mining. 
Nonetheless, radical reform of the mining industry did feature among
the objectives listed by Palika’s 1977 manifesto, which aimed “to oppose
the system of repression established by the French, and the exploitative
nickel industry; the return of all land stolen by settlers, missionaries, sln
and the French government, for the benefit of the Kanak people on a com-
munal basis; and the nationalisation of industries” (quoted in Howard
1991, 151). Five years later, exclusion of the Kanak from the mining indus-
try prompted members of a pro-independence political group, Libération
kanak socialiste, to declare, “In New Caledonia, to the pillage of mining
resources (nickel, chrome) is added the oppression of the Kanak people,
kept out of economic development and submitted to the political domi-
nation of France” (quoted in Douyere and others 1985, 2). However, this
situation—and hence these attitudes—altered in 1990 when, after over a
year of negotiations, smsp and its mining concessions changed hands
from rpcr deputy Jacques Lafleur to the semipublic company sofinor
(Société de financement et d’investissement de la province Nord), which
was created just before this purchase. Seventy-five percent of sofinor
capital was contributed by the Northern Province, governed by Kanak
pro-independence activists. This transfer, which followed on the 1988
Matignon Accords’ promise of economic readjustment in favor of the
underprivileged north, embodied many hopes that the Kanak would
finally be able to participate in a significant way in the territory’s mining
industry. The choice of a man of Sino-Vietnamese origin, André Dang, as
the first smsp leader after this transfer led to some protests by national-
ist Kanak (Henningham 1992b, 77). In 1999, Dang retired, leaving smsp
in the hands of Kanak entrepreneur Raphaël Pidjot, but Dang was obliged
to resume his former responsibilities when Pidjot perished in a helicopter
crash in November 2000.
Future Plans 
Currently, the French company sln possesses New Caledonia’s only nickel
refinery, located at Doniambo, on the outskirts of Nouméa. However,
several multinational mining companies have recently expressed interest
in constructing nickel refineries on Grande Terre. The two most advanced
and widely publicized projects are planned by rival Canadian companies,
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both based in Sudbury, Ontario. The construction of each of the two
refineries will require several years of labor from 2,000 people, many of
whom will be recruited from abroad, and the operation of each refinery
is expected to generate 700–800 direct jobs and indirect employment for
another 1,500–2,000 people. 
One of these projects, known as Goro-Nickel and located at Goro near
the southern town of Yaté (see map 1), is run by Inco in conjunction with
the French State. In 1999, Inco completed construction of its us$50 mil-
lion pilot plant, designed to test a new hydrometallurgical and solvent
extraction process technology that uses sulfuric acid to extract metal from
ore. Construction of the much larger, us$1.4 billion, fully integrated com-
mercial nickel-cobalt mining and production facility, partly subsidized by
the French government, was slated for completion in late 2004. However,
on 6 December 2002, construction was suddenly postponed for at least six
months, and the Filipino and Australian workers sent home, while Inco
officials reevaluated their options given the project’s unexpectedly high
financial costs. This project has also caused much consternation among
members of local nongovernmental environmental organizations, such as
Action Biosphère and Corail Vivant, which fear serious marine pollution
from the tailings and waste products produced by the new extraction pro-
cess. After neutralization of acids and a period of time in a settlement
basin, 15,000 cubic meters of wastewater per day would be dumped
directly into the sea at a depth of forty meters. The wastewater would
inevitably include heavy metals and other toxic compounds, which, envi-
ronmentalists claim, would be dispersed by currents into the nearby Mer-
let Marine Reserve. 
Residents of the area around Yaté were angry that the pilot refinery had
been constructed “behind their back” (NC 2001a). In 2000, they formed a
gdpl (Groupement de droit particulier local), a structure that as of 1989
allows clans to reclaim customary areas without having to use the lands
for commercial purposes. This gdpl, known as Ko Mwa Ï, represented
the self-styled local customary landowner clans, composed of about 3,500
persons. The twenty-eight members of the gdpl, most of whom were
either elected officials or very active members of the anti-independence
political party rpcr, intended to “reserve [ie, reclaim] large areas of land
around or near the future Inco refinery” (NC 2001b) so as to be able to
control the installation of the refinery. At the same time, local chiefs and
presidents of the Councils of Elders joined to form a twelve-member
Council of Wise Men. Meanwhile, twelve other community members
formed the Société mélanésienne de participations et d’investissements du
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Grand Sud, an association with the mandate of receiving percentages of
the profits of all enterprises directly or indirectly associated with the con-
struction of the refinery. In total, they demanded 19 billion fcfp from
Inco. In September 2002, representatives of Ko Mwai Ï met with Inco’s
chief executive officer, Scott Hand, to remind him of the importance of
Kanak participation in Goro-Nickel. Hand replied that the construction
phase would be very short and recommended that the local population
focus more on the exploitation phase, which would be much more long-
term (NC 2002b). 
Unlike the local residents with their exorbitant demands, the Southern
Province went to the opposite extreme, providing Inco with very sub-
stantial tax breaks over fifteen years and making training programs avail-
able for Inco’s employees. In exchange, they requested only that 5 percent
of the project be owned by New Caledonia (in contrast to smsp’s owner-
ship of 51 percent of the Koniambo Project; see below). In July 2002, the
province granted a research permit to Inco at Prony, a site extremely rich
in nickel. The exploitation of this deposit would allow the refinery at Goro
to double or triple its production. This move led to protests from the main
coalition of independence parties, flnks, whose members feared that these
conditions would allow Goro-Nickel to outcompete the Koniambo Pro-
ject, an allegation denied by the loyalist rpcr. The flnks demanded that
New Caledonia receive a greater share in Inco’s project and supported
both a rally in early July (assembling about 2,000–3,000 people) and a
general strike on 27 September 2002, to protest Inco’s being granted a
research permit at Prony. At the same time, environmental groups, trade
unions, pro-independence parties, and other nongovernmental organiza-
tions joined to form the Action Group for the Defense and Management
of the Prony Heritage (Collectif pour la défense et la maîtrise du patri-
moine de Prony). In August 2002, one Kanak member of this group wrote
a letter to the high commissioner stating that the permit had been granted
despite “formal opposition from the indigenous people,” rendering it “in
violation of all the principles adopted by the international community con-
cerning the protection and promotion of the rights of indigenous peoples.”
The letter urged the high commissioner to “act to prevent any unrest that
might result from the attitude of the executive of the Southern Province
by interceding with the latter in order to make him change his mind.” On
18 November 2002, after negotiations with Inco ceo Scott Hand, rpcr
leader Jacques Lafleur announced that Inco would grant New Caledonia
an additional 5 percent of Goro’s capital, “free of charge” (NC 2002c).
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Although this total of 10 percent for New Caledonia was less than the 20
percent he had hoped for, the mayor of Yaté pronounced himself in favor
of the development. The action group disagreed, however, and on 16
December 2002 organized a rally, coinciding with a visit from the minis-
ter responsible for France’s overseas possessions, to protest the granting
of the research permit to Inco.
Falconbridge/smsp’s Koniambo Project, located on the massif between
Koné and Voh (see map 1), has not faced such opposition or demands,
nor is it the focus of environmentalists’ concerns. In November 2001, New
Caledonia’s Human Rights League (Ligue des droits de l’homme) orga-
nized a conference and debate on the theme of “Environment and Sustain-
able Development,” and invited representatives from sln, Inco, smsp,
and Falconbridge, along with groups such as Action Biosphère, Corail
Vivant, World Wide Fund for Nature, and other local or international
human rights or environmental nongovernmental organizations. The next
day the local newspaper reported, “Falconbridge got off scot-free. But sln
for its smoke and its slag, and Inco for its effluents, its Filipinos [future
construction workers] and its lack of transparency, were on Wednesday
evening the target of environmental defense associations” (Lepot 2001).
Part of the reason that Falconbridge has managed to avoid such criticism
is undoubtedly that the pyrometallurgical technology that it plans to use,
at least at first, is well tested.9 It has also benefited from the fact that envi-
ronmental groups see the Inco project, which is further along, as a more
pressing threat. However, as demonstrated in the following sections, per-
haps the most important reason why no one dares challenge the Koni-
ambo Project is its highly politicized nature. 
The History of the Koniambo Project 
Falconbridge is the world’s third largest producer of refined nickel, with
a market capitalization of us$2.2 billion. In 1994 the smsp chief execu-
tive officer, André Dang, contacted Falconbridge with a proposal for the
joint construction of a nickel refinery to be located in New Caledonia’s
Northern Province. Falconbridge subsequently conducted studies on the
area’s ore and on smsp itself. In August 1995, the two mining companies
signed a draft agreement, and on 19 June 1996, smsp and Falconbridge
officially joined forces to begin plans for construction of the refinery. In
October 1996, smsp presented the project to the French government.
smsp would own 51 percent of the capital and Falconbridge 49 percent.
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The refinery would be a ferro-nickel plant that would use pyrometallur-
gical fusion techniques to treat ore with an average nickel content of only
2.5 percent, and would generate 54,000 tons of nickel per year, thereby
doubling the territory’s productive capacity. The refinery’s operation
would require an electrical power station of 180 megawatts and a deep-
water port, as well as a dam to provide 6 cubic hectometers /year of fresh
water to cool the machinery. 
In order for this project to succeed, access to adequate mineral resources
would be necessary, and therefore the mining company requested that it
be allowed to exchange the Poum Massif, to which it held mineral rights,
for the far richer Tiébaghi Massif, held by sln. Independence party lead-
ers even demanded the exchange of these two massifs as a precondition to
the resumption of talks with the French government, which had stagnated
(Dufour 1996). smsp did not obtain Tiébaghi, but after several months
of stormy negotiations the French government decided that smsp could
exchange Poum for the Koniambo Massif, to which mineral rights were
held by the French mining and metallurgical company Eramet and its sub-
sidiary, sln. The French government compensated sln for the difference
in value of the two massifs, and on 1 February 1998, the French govern-
ment, the Territory of New Caledonia, Eramet, sln, and smsp all signed
the Bercy Accord. This agreement stipulated that the granting of the
Koniambo Massif to smsp depended on the completion of feasibility
studies, the decision to construct a refinery, and the creation by 31 Janu-
ary 2007 of an investment program of at least us$100 million. This pro-
ject instantly received the support of pro-independence flnks leaders,
who saw it as a way to counterbalance the economic weight of rpcr-led
Nouméa. In fact, from the beginning the project was highly politicized,
with each political movement supporting one of the mining companies:
flnks behind smsp, rpcr behind sln, and the French government, Era-
met’s majority shareholder, divided between its political and economic
interests (Carnuccini and Guillaud 1997, 95–96). 
The Koniambo Massif, 20 kilometers long by 6–10 kilometers wide,
with a maximum altitude of 940 meters, has a mineralized surface of
approximately 20 square kilometers and a potential of 132 million tons
of ore with at least 2.46 percent nickel content. It was mined as early as
1888 by a multitude of small companies, with peak activity between 1938
and 1942 (smsp 1998). Between 1940 and 1947 the massif was exploited
exclusively by sln (Nakache 1999). Having extracted as much nickel as
feasible with then available technology, that mining company abandoned
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the massif. The remaining soils consist of high-quality saprolite (destined
for a pyrometallurgic treatment), covered by mineralized limonite, which
could eventually be treated by a hydrometallurgic process. This massif has
been kept as a reserve for future nickel production; its summits and slopes
are almost intact and its narrow, gravelly watercourses have not been sig-
nificantly modified by mining activity (Bird and others 1984, 28). 
By the end of 2004, Falconbridge plans to decide whether or not to
construct the refinery. If it goes ahead, construction will take three years
and production will commence in mid to late 2008. Falconbridge has esti-
mated that if its decision is positive, the construction of the refinery will
create 2,000 jobs, and the mining project itself will create 700–750 direct
jobs and 2,000 indirect ones. Many of the activities would require skilled
labor and thus the company plans to recruit a large number of workers
from overseas. However, local politicians as well as villagers expect sub-
stantial financial benefits, both from employment with the project and
from the increased demand for locally supplied products and services. 
Politico-economic Importance of the Project 
Because they have the capacity to generate quick, enormous revenues,
mining projects often hold out the promise of economic transformation on
which to build a solid political structure. In the early days of indepen-
dence in Papua New Guinea, for instance, many mining projects (includ-
ing, ironically, the Panguna mine on Bougainville) were conceived as
“nation-building exercises” (John Burton, pers comm, Aug 2001). Simi-
larly, the Ok Tedi mine “symbolised the nationalism and optimism of the
new state” of Papua New Guinea (King 1997, 94). While New Caledonia
is not (yet) an independent state, and although the connection between
mining and nationalism is still a novelty (as explained earlier), the Koni-
ambo Project in some ways embodies a nationalistic vision. Suddenly, the
Kanak of the Northern Province are acquiring access to mineral wealth,
in a radical departure from their previous exclusion from the mining sec-
tor. That this project is imbued with great politico-economic importance,
at both the national and the village level, is evidenced by the multitude of
newspaper articles, politicians’ speeches, and individuals’ statements that
make reference to it. 
Many people hope that the project will entail an economic readjust-
ment or “rebalancing” (rééquilibrage) as promised in the Matignon and
Nouméa Accords, allowing the Northern Province to be placed on more
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equal footing with the Southern Province. In the south, one nickel refin-
ery (run by sln) has long been in place and the construction of another is
planned by the Canadian multinational Inco—prompting flnks spokes-
person Victor Tutugoro to declare, “If the South has two refineries and
the North none, that would be truly disastrous!” (quoted in Serre 2002).
The Koniambo Project also fits with a strategy (which was originally pro-
posed in 1957 by Maurice Lenormand, vice president of the Government
Council, and which has gained momentum over the last few decades) of
creating an urban economic pole in the North as a counterweight to Nou-
méa (Freyss 1995, 412). In the Voh-Koné area, many local residents expect
the project and associated development of the region to provide direct or
indirect money-making opportunities for young people. The mayor of
Voh has expressed the opinion that the project represents a radical depar-
ture from the historical economic situation, in which Kanak had always
been excluded from economic development (Guigui Dounehote, Voh, pers
comm, June 2001). 
Moreover, many leaders have expressed high hopes that the Koniambo
Project would not only provide benefits for Kanak, to balance the finan-
cial privilege long held by other ethnic groups, but would also ensure the
economic self-sufficiency necessary for political autonomy. Since nickel is
the archipelago’s only high-value economic resource, it is often said that
“whoever controls nickel controls New Caledonia.” The mayor of Koné,
a member of the militant pro-independence party Palika, explained that,
unlike other countries that had achieved independence through warfare,
New Caledonia had chosen the path of negotiation and economic devel-
opment. Autonomy would be made possible by large-scale industrial pro-
jects: “The watchword is, we need a viable independence for New Cale-
donia” (Joseph Goromido, Koné, personal interview, June 2001). Political
independence therefore requires a sound economic basis, a sentiment
echoed by the Palika mayor of Voh: “It’s not enough to have political inde-
pendence, we need economic independence as well” (Guigui Dounehote,
Voh, pers comm June 2001). A few years earlier, in an interview with a
pro-independence newspaper, Raphaël Pidjot, the late chief executive offi-
cer of smsp, had described his view of the significance of the project: “I
would say that the Northern Refinery project is bringing credibility to a
process that was undertaken a few years ago through the signing of the
Matignon Accords by Jean-Marie Tjibaou and thus even by the flnks
who felt, as you said, that the mining resources should be considered as
a national heritage. . . . We have to include the Northern Refinery as the
result of all the steps undertaken (quoted in Uregei and Waia 1996, 27). 
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Not only did members of pro-independence parties support the Koni-
ambo Project as a means of laying the ground for a future independence;
conservative elements also recognized the importance of providing eco-
nomic benefits in order to maintain peace in New Caledonia. President
Chirac expressed his support for the project, as did the minister responsi-
ble for France’s overseas possessions, Brigitte Girardin, who called it “the
priority of priorities” (NC 2002b). Jacques Lafleur, rpcr president, stated
more pragmatically, “We know very well that if one province worked and
the other didn’t, that would endanger the accords that we had so much
trouble negotiating” (NC 2002a). The Koniambo Project is thus viewed
either as representing the possibility of greater political and economic
autonomy for Kanak as a precursor to independence or, in contrast, as
yet another in a series of actions that have used economic gains to deter
pro-independence aspirations. 
Conclusion: Translating Political Capital into
Economic Gain—But For Whom? 
A brief glance at New Caledonia’s recent history may indicate the more
likely of the two possible outcomes. For the past fifteen years, the archi-
pelago’s political scene has been devoid of violent demands for autonomy.
This suggests that the metropolitan government and loyalists may indeed
have succeeded in their attempts to convince independence-minded Kanak
—through financial assistance that increases political dependency—to
focus their efforts on economic development while postponing the push
for independence to a point in the indeterminately distant future. On the
flip side of the coin, pro-independence leaders have been able to use
France’s desire to maintain possession of New Caledonia as an economic
bargaining chip. For instance, as discussed in this article, they have used
political pressure to negotiate a very favorable deal for their mining com-
pany. Meanwhile, largely because of the project’s promises of “rebalanc-
ing” New Caledonia’s economic disequilibrium, local villagers have great
expectations of monetary benefits from the Koniambo Project (although,
relatively speaking, their aspirations are pathetically modest, as suggested
in figure 1). Clearly, this situation contrasts sharply with the bleak pros-
pects of many indigenous groups located near mining sites around the
world.
However, history has shown, for New Caledonia as for elsewhere in
Melanesia, that the generation of economic benefits is not a sufficient con-
dition for harmony, either within the nation at large or within small-scale
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communities. Perhaps more pressing than the project’s macropolitical sig-
nificance are questions about whether or not local people will actually
receive a large portion of these benefits in the form of direct or indirect
employment, and whether even distribution of profits among community
members will take place or uneven distribution will lead to explosive
resentment. These questions are all the more relevant in light of long-
standing tendencies toward intense intracommunity competition for social
status in New Caledonia.10 As I have explored at length elsewhere, such
“The boom is back!!! It’s great! There will be terrific economic benefits!!! 
I’m sure we’ll double our sales.” [On the sign:] “Buy our good local 
home-made bread.”
Figure 1. A local cartoonist’s vision of local people’s expectations. Reprinted
by permission of the cartoonist.
Source: Les Nouvelles-Calédoniennes, 2 July 2001.
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rivalry has already begun to affect local people’s engagements with the
Koniambo Project, as preexistent intravillage tensions become mapped
onto current micropolitical conflicts concerning expectations of differen-
tial benefits from the mining project (Horowitz 2002). 
* * *
I am grateful to the School of Resources, Environment, and Society of the
Australian National University for financial assistance with the research on which
this paper is based. Thanks also to Bronwen Douglas, Chris Ballard, Richard
Baker, Alban Bensa, and two anonymous reviewers for helpful comments on the
content of this paper. Any errors of fact or interpretation, however, remain exclu-
sively my own responsibility. 
Notes 
1 People of European origins account for another 34 percent, while the
remainder of the population is composed of Wallisians (9 percent), Indonesians
(3 percent), Tahitians (3 percent), Vietnamese (1 percent), and others (5 percent)
(itsee 2001). 
2 Collaboration with non-French mining companies is not necessarily a polit-
ical strategy; loyalists are also obliged to seek technical support from elsewhere,
as with the Goro-Nickel project in the Southern Province, jointly operated by a
Canadian multinational (Inco) and the French State. However, members of pro-
independence parties state explicitly that they view such partnerships as deliber-
ate attempts to loosen politico-economic ties to the metropole. 
3 This and all subsequent translations from the French are my own. 
4 These nations include Australia (Howitt 1991; Altman 1992; Lane and
Chase 1996); New Zealand (Barclay-Kerr 1991; Dixon 1991; Mahuta 1992;
Memon and Cullen 1996); Canada (McHugh 1996); Brazil (Goodman and Hall
1990); Indonesia (Robinson 1991); Malaysia (Arentz 1996; Horowitz 1998);
Fiji (Plange 1991; Emberson-Bain 1994); Zimbabwe (Moore 1993, 1996, 1998a,
1998b); as well as Thailand, Vietnam, and Laos (Hirsch 1996; Tubtim and others
1996). 
5 For examples of successful protests, see Jackson 1991; Davies and Young
1996; Hviding and Baines 1996, 81–83; Hyndman and Duhaylungsod 1996; and
O’Faircheallaigh 1996.
6 fcfp: French Pacific francs, used in New Caledonia, Wallis and Futuna, and
French Polynesia. In 2002, the exchange rate was approximately 69 fcfp to the
Australian dollar and 134 fcfp to the US dollar. 
7 Notably, in Papua New Guinea, which has abundant mineral resources and
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where local people own 97 percent of land, compensation agreements form a
crucial part of any mining negotiations. 
8 See also Thompson 1984; Carnuccini 1999; Soriano 2000, 241.
9 Falconbridge has hinted at the strong possibility that it will use hydrometal-
lurgical techniques at a later stage. Pyrometallury involves the use of heat-gener-
ating smelters to extract nickel metal from ore. Hydrometallurgy involves leach-
ing metals from ore in a sulfuric acid medium.
10 See Bensa and Rivierre 1983; Douglas 1994, 176; Naepels 1998, 131; Pil-
lon 1998, 222; Godin 1999, 320; Gopoea 1999.
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Abstract 
In New Caledonia, pro-independence leaders perceive economic autonomy as a
prerequisite for political independence. The Koniambo Project, a joint venture
between a Canadian multinational and a local mining company, is seen by many
Kanak as an opportunity to loosen economic ties to metropolitan France. Indeed,
unlike cases in which large-scale resource extraction has disadvantaged local
groups and intensified demands for political rights, the Koniambo Project resulted
from pro-independence activism. This atypical situation can be explained by the
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French government’s strategy in New Caledonia. Violent uprisings in the mid-
1980s ended with accords that promised economic development. Radical activ-
ists believed this would pave the way for independence while their opponents
hoped to obviate such aspirations. Similarly, the Koniambo Project is viewed
either as an opportunity for greater Kanak autonomy or as yet another in a series
of actions that have used economic gains to deter pro-independence efforts. 
keywords: New Caledonia, Kanak, mining, independence movement, Koni-
ambo Project, Falconbridge, France
 
